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tion seems equally clear. The Negotiable Instruments Law reI
quires that a promissory note contain a promise to pay another. 7
Obviously an unendorsed instrument payable to "myself" does
not meet this requisite.'
Furthermore, the negative tenor of
the concluding sentence of R.S. 7:184 following an extensive
definition of a negotiable promissory note19 would seem to imply
that such incomplete instruments are to be excluded from the
definition of a promissory note. The court was correct, therefore, in treating the instrument as null and requiring that suit
to recover be brought within the three-year prescription period
on money lent.
Stanford 0. Bardwell, Jr.

TORTS -

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY INFANTS

Suit was brought against a father to recover for damages
done by his six-year-old child to a neighbor's home and its furnishings. The plaintiff predicated liability on Louisiana Civil
Code article 2318, which makes the father liable for damages
caused by his children without regard to his personal fault.
The district court maintained defendant's exception of no cause
of action and the court of appeal affirmed. Held, a petition alleging property damage deliberately, wantonly, and maliciously
inflicted by a child of six, but failing to allege the personal fault
of the parent, does not state a cause of action against the father
under article 2318, since a six-year-old child is legally incapable
of fault. Scottish Union and National Ins. Co. v. Prange, 154
So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
Neither in France nor at common law is the parent vicariously liable for the torts of his children simply by virtue of the
familial relationship.' The principal basis of parental liability
Ross, 170 So. 400 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936) ; Prestenbach v. Mansur, 14 La.
App. 429, 129 So. 445 (1930) ; Bank of St. Martinville v. Duchamp, 6 La. App.
562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1927).
17. See note 3 supra. See also Navin v. McCarty, 240 Mass. 447, 1344 N.E.
232 (1922) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Payne, 111 Mo. 291, 20 S.W. 41 (1892).
18. Under elementary obligations principles, it is difficult to see how an
instrument whose promissor and promissee are the same party could be a contract
of any kind, much less a promissory note.
19. See note 3 supra.
1. French authorities: FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384; 1 MAZEAUD,
THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSIBILITt
"

TUELLE n

732-734, 764 (5th ed. 1957)

TRAIT]t
CIVILE D]tLICTUELLE ET CONTRAC-

[hereinafter cited as

MAZEAUD];

2
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in both legal systems is the parent's own negligence;2 conse-

quently it is immaterial whether the child is at fault or mature
enough to be chargeable with tortious conduct.8 In common law

jurisdictions the parent may incur liability if he has instructed
or encouraged the child to commit the act,4 or has failed to
supervise the child adequately, 5 or has negligently entrusted a
dangerous instrumentality to his child,6 or has failed to warn
a third person of a dangerous disposition in the child of which
he had actual or presumptive knowledge. 7 Closer living conditions and more extensive use of automobiles by minors have
given rise to the problem of allocating the risk of damages
caused by children in cases where the parent's negligence would
be difficult or impossible to establish. Several jurisdictions

have responded with jurisprudentia 8 and statutory 9 rules imPLANIOL, Civir LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION nY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 909 (1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]. Common

law authorities: PROSSER, TORTS § 102 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See generally 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.13 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
HARPER & JAMES]. A parent may, however, be vicariously liable on the basis on
an agency relationship with the child or the "family purpose" doctrine. 2 HARPER & JAMES §§ 26.12, 26.15; PROSSER, §§ 66, 102. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
2. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384; 1 MAZEAUD n0 l 732-734, 764; PROSSER
§ 102.
3. Though at common law this conclusion never seems to have been in doubt,
it was debated in France. 1 MAZEAUD n o 763. The child's maturity and the nature of his act may nevertheless be relevant in determining the parent's fault
and thus indirectly affect his liability. Id. n 764.
4. E.g., Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944) ; Trahan v. Smith,
239 S.W. 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
5. E.g., Kuchlik v. Feuer, 239 App. Div. 338, 267 N.Y. Supp. 256 (1933)
Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S.D. 237, 76 N.W. 933 (1898) ; Norton v. Payne, 154
Wash. 241, 281 Pac. 991 (1929).
6. E.g., Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920) ; Meers v.
McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62 S.W. 1013 (1901). Also, articles not inherently dangerous but likely to be put to a dangerous use by the child: e.g., Davis v. Gavales,
37 Ga. App. 242, 139 S.E. 577 (1927) (bicycle) ; Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277
App. Div. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1950) (baseball bat).
7. E.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 243 P.2d 675 (1953) ; Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 App. Div. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1950).
8. Under the "family purpose" doctrine, adopted in about half the states, the
owner of an automobile is liable for the negligence of a member of the family
driving the car for his own pleasure or convenience, or on a family mission, with
the express or implied consent of the owner. The doctrine is justified on a
fictitious agency relationship, the consenting owner supposedly making the family purpose his "business" and the user his agent or servant. E.g., Benton v.
Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919) ; Dribble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 65
A.2d 479 (1949) ; Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915) ; Stevens
v. Van Deusen, 56 N.M. 128, 241 P.2d 331 (1952) ; King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn.
217, 204 S.W. 396 (1918) ; Allison v. Bartelt, 121 Wash. 418, 209 Pac. 863
(1922). See generally HARPER & JAMES §§ 8.13, 26.15; PROSSER §§ 66, 102; Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MICH. L. REV. 846 (1928).
9. E.g., CALIF. VEHICLE CODE § 402; IOWA CODE § 5037.09 (1939); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 256.29 (1948) ; N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 59. These are

"permissive user" statutes which make the owner of an automobile liable for the
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posing no-fault liability on the parent in certain limited circumstances. These rules evidence a policy determination that the
expense of damages characteristically caused by children should

be a family responsibility.
In France a parent is responsible for the acts of his children
which cause damage to a third person unless the parent can
show he could not have prevented the act. 10 Since in France the
parent's fault is presumed and must be rebutted to avoid liabil-

ity, 1 the burden placed on the parent is more severe than at
common law.
Louisiana has not been faced with the problem of devising
new bases of parental liability to meet changing social needs.
Article 231812 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that the
negligence of a person operating the vehicle with his consent, including the owner's minor child. A more recent development is enactment of statutes imposing
strict liability in certain limited amounts on a parent for property damage done
intentionally by minor children. E.g., CAL. CIV. CoDE § 1714.1; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-801 (1951).
10. FRENCii CIVIL CODE art. 1384 (Wright's Transl. 1908)
"...
A father
and (after the death of the husband) the mother are responsible for the damage
caused by their children under age who live with them. . . . This responsibility
exists unless the father, mother . . . prove that they could not prevent the act in
respect of which the liability arises." See generally 1 MAZEAUD no 732-779.
11. 1 MAZEAUID no 766. The basis of liability under article 1384 and the presumption of the parent's fault is the civilian doctrine of paternal authority over
the child's conduct which is accompanied by a duty to third parties to prevent
harmful acts of the child. Id. n 734. The purpose of the presumption is to facilitate recovery by reversing the burden of proof. Id. no 766. As a general rule
the parent may relieve himself of liability by showing he has supervised the child
as a reasonable parent should and that the fault of the child was not due to a
poor upbringing or to a fault of character. Id. n 778. See generally id. no, 766779.
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2318 (1870) : "The father, or after his decease, the
mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other
persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons." The basis for this
provision is paternal authority to control the child's conduct. Id. arts. 216-218,
237; e.g., Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. 2d 359 (1942) ; Mullins v.
Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885) ; Coats v. Roberts, 35 La. Ann. 891 (1883) ; Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Jackson v. Ratliff, 84
So. 2d 103 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1956). Thus when paternal authority is interrupted by the child's mandatory participation in civil or military services the
parent is not liable. Coats v. Roberts, supra (son on posse comitatus) ; Simmons
v. Sorenson, 71 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (son in army, though home
on furlough). Likewise, a parent is relieved of liability after his paternal authority has been divested by judicial decree. Jackson v. Ratliff, 84 So. 2d 103 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1956) (divorce, custody granted to grandmother). In respect to
the requirement that the child must be residing with his parents, it has been
held common residency is not a necessary allegation in a suit against the parent.
Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922) ; McInnis v. Terry, 121 So. 2d
329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). As long as paternal authority is not interrupted,
the residence of the child is considered that of the parent, though in fact they live
apart. Toca v. Rojas, supra; Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1961). A parent is liable for torts of adopted as well as natural children.
McInnis v. Terry, supra.
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father is liable for the damages caused by his minor or unemancipated children. Observing the omission from this article of
the clause contained in the corresponding French Civil Code provision 13 whereby the parent can escape liability by showing he
could not have prevented the child's act, the Louisiana courts
have consistently held under article 2318 that the parent is liable regardless of the absence of fault on his part.14 Though
there have been some indications to the contrary, 15 the prevailing view is that the parent's liability under article 2318 is vicarious 16 and that a parent will not be liable unless the child is
8
at fault 1'7 and, a fortiori, old enough to be capable of fault.'
This conclusion has been reached by construing article 2318 in
light of article 237 which provides the parent is liable for the
delicts and quasi-delicts of his children.' 9
It is the general rule that a minor is liable for his torts both
13. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384 (quoted note 10, supra). The discrepancy
between the French and Louisiana provisions was noted in Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 591-98, 157 So. 121, 122-25 (1934) and Mullins v. Blaise,
37 La. Ann. 92, 94 (1885). It is possible the omission of the parent's "escape
clause" from the Louisiana provision was an unintended result of legislative
revision. See Chief Justice O'Niell's discussion in Johnson v. Butterworth, supra.
14. E.g., Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934) ; Rush v.
Town of Farmerville, 156 La. 857, 101 So. 243 (1924) ; Toca v. Rojas, 152 La.
317, 93 So. 209 (1922) ; Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917) ;
Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885) ; Marrioneaux v. Brugier, 35 La. Ann.
13 (1883) ; Honeycutt v. Carver, 25 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) ; Phillips
v. D'Amico, 21 So. 2d 748 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945). Liability may also be
predicated on the parent's personal fault under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
Johnson v. Butterworth, supra at 611, 157 So. at 129; of. Briggs v. Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Phillips v. D'Amico, supra.
15. See Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. 2d 359 (1942) ; Mullins v.
Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92, 93 (1.885) ; Cleaveland v. Mayo, 19 La. 414, 417 (1.841) ;
Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So. 2d 720, 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Kern v. Knight,
127 So. 133, 137 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930). In these cases the courts have espoused the view that liability under article 2318 is based on a presumed fault of
the parent in failing to supervise the child adequately. Under this interpretation
it would be theoretically consistent to hold the parent liable regardless of the
child's lack of maturity or legal fault. See Mullins v. Blaise, supra at 93. However, it need not result that the parent be liable for all damages caused by the
child, since it would seem such a presumption of fault should only apply when
the act of the child is such that a reasonable parent would have tried to prevent it.
16. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934) ; Toca v. Rojas,
152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922) ; Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 131
So. 2d 831 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Hay v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 66
So. 2d 371 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953); Honeycutt v. Carver, 25 So. 2d 99 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1946); Phillips v. D'Amico, 21 So. 2d 748 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1945) ; Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Savoie v. Walker,
183 So. 530 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938) ; Cornelius v. Montegut, 8 Orl. App. 358
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1911).
17. See cases cited note 16 supra.
18. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934).
19. Id. at 611, 157 So. at 129; Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 327, 93 So. 108,
111 (1922) ; Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460, 464 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
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at common law 20 and in France, 21 but in both legal systems exceptions have been created to mitigate an infant's liability. At
common law the standard of care employed to determine a
child's negligence generally fluctuates according to his age and
maturity, 22 so that a very young child may be relieved of liability where an adult would be liable, simply by finding no negligence.23 A minority of jurisdictions refuse to apply the fluctuating criterion to a child under seven, holding such child legally incapable of negligence altogether. 24 A child may be relieved
of liability for an intentional tort if it is found his tender age
and lack of maturity negate the presence of the particular mental state necessary for the tort in question. 25 In France a child
20. Jennings v. Rundall, 8 T.R. 335, 101 Eng. Rep. 419 (1799); Ellis v.
D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) ; Watson v. Wrightson, 26
Ind. App. 437, 59 N.E. 1064 (1901) ; Patterson v. Kasper, 182 Mich, 281, 148
N.W. 690 (1914) ; Churchill v. White, 58 Neb. 22, 78 N.W. 369 (1899) ; Chasser
v. Hutton, 139 Misc. 623, 248 N.Y. Supp. 136 (1931) ; Vermont Accept. Corp. v.
Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 Atl. 199 (1931) ; Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091
(Wash. 1955) ; Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893 (1911). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES § 8.13; PROSSER § 109.
21. FRENcH CIVIL CODE art. 1310; 1 MAZEAUD no, 449, 462; PLANIOL no. 879.
22. Kitsap County Transp. Co. v. Harvey, 15 F.2d 166 (9th Cir. 1927) ; Hoyt
v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 500, 182 P.2d 234 (1947) ; Ackerman v. Advance
Petroleum Transp., 304 Mich. 96, 7 N.W.2d 235 (1942) ; Johnson v. St. Paul
City Ry., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. 900 (1897) ; Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H.
501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931) ; Karr v. McNeil, 92 Ohio App. 458, 110 N.E.2d 714
(1952) ; Gulf, C. & S.F. R.R. v. McWhirter, 77 Tex. 356, 14 S.W. 26 (1890) ;
Thomas v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 47 Utah 394, 154 Pac. 777 (1916) ; Quinn v.
Ross Motor Car Co., 157 Wis. 543, 147 N.W. 1000 (1914) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES
§§ 8.13, at 658, 16.8; PROSSER § 31, at 127-28; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 283, comment e, § 464 (1939). See generally Bohlen, Liability in Tort of lnfants and Insane Persons, 23 Micir. L. REV. 9 (1924) ; Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618 (1927).
23. E.g., Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 500, 182 P.2d 234 (1947) (child
not negligent in kicking can in group of boys) ; Grant v. Mays, 129 S.E.2d 10
(Va. 1963) (child bicyclist not contributorily negligent in riding bicycle on busy
highway).
24. E.g., Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902) ; Dixon
v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126 S.W.2d 448 (1939) ; Burns v. Eminger, 81 Mont.
79, 261 Pac. 613 (1927) ; Dodd v. Spartanburg Ry. G. & E. Co., 95 S.C. 9, 78
S.E. 525 (1913) ; PROSSER § 31, at 128. While some jurisdictions adhering to the
majority view (see note 21 supra and accompanying text) hold a very young
child may be legally incapable of negligence, they prescribe no arbitrary age limit
and apparently decide the question according to the peculiar facts of each case.
E.g., Gonzales v. Davis, 197 Cal. 256, 240 Pac. 16 (1925) ; Anthony v. Dutton, 73
Ga. App. 389, 36 S.E.2d 836 (1946) ; Nagy v. Balogh, 337 Mich. 691, 61 N.W.2d
47 (1953) ; Oviatt v. Camarra, 210 Ore. 445, 311 P.2d 746 (1957) ; Quattrochi v.
Pittsburgh Rys., 309 Pa. 377, 164 Atl. 59 (1932).
25. Seabury v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 300-01, 148 N.E.2d 49, 54
(1958) ; Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 785, 189 S.W. 1143, 1145 (1916) ;
Swoboda v. Nowak, 213 Mo. App. 452, 464, 255 S.W. 1079, 1082 (1923) ; Munden
v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 663-64, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080 (1910) ; Williams v.
Hays, 143 N.Y. 442, 446, 38 N.E. 449, 450 (1894) ; Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend.
391 (N.Y. 1829); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 887, comment a (1939); PROSSER
§ 109, at 788. The passages cited in the above cases have reference to an infant's
incapacity for malice and intent necessary for libel or slander. Since intent was
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beneath the "age of reason" is said to be incapable of fault and
thus relieved of all tort liability. 26 Whether a child has reached
the age of reason is determined in each case by the judge's decision whether, considering the maturity of the child and the
nature of the act in question, the child had sufficient discernment to be aware of his actions.2 7 Thus there is no fixed age at
28
which liability begins.
In the area of unintended harms it is clear the Louisiana
courts have adopted the view that a child of seven years or
under is legally incapable of negligence. 29 A child above seven
may be liable for negligence, but, as at common law, is held
only to a standard of care appropriate to his age.80 However,
primarily because of a paucity of jurisprudence, 1 no such cernot a requisite for trespass at common law, infants have frequently been held
liable for it and like torts. E.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253
P.2d 675 (1953) (assault and battery; four years) ; Hutching v. Engel, 17 Wis.
237 (1863) (trespass; six years) ; Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218 (N.Y.
1859) (trespass to chattels) ; Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 148
N.E.2d 49 (1958) (arson; six years). For an exhaustive discussion of the area
see Bohlen, LIABILITY IN

TORT OF INFANTS AND INSANE PERSONS, 23 MIcH. L.

REv. 9 (1924). The modern view is that intent is a requisite for torts akin to
trespass, e.g., for battery, intent to inflict harmful or offensive bodily contact.
RESTATEMENT,

TORTS

§§ 13, 16 (1939) ; PROSSER § 9.

It

would thus seem an

infant should be relieved of liability if too immature to possess such intent. See
the D'Angelo and Seaburg cases, supra, in which infants were held liable for battery and arson respectively, but only after concluding they were old enough to
entertain the required intent.
o"
26. 1 MAZEAvD n
409, 451, 455; 2 PLANIOL no. 879.

27. 1 MAZEAUD n" 451, 458-459; 2 PLANIOL no. 879. Mazeaud indicates the
criterion is not so much the development of a moral conscience, but intelligence,
discernment, and free will. 1 MAZEAUD n- 458-459.
28. 1 MAZEAUD n ° 451; 2 PLANIOL no. 879.
29. Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953) ; Bodin v. Texas Co.,
186 So. 390 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939) ; Borman v. Lafargue, 183 So. 548 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1938). The Louisiana rule thus differs from the minority common
law rule that a child under seven is incapable of negligence. See note 23 supra
and accompanying text. Prior to Jackson, Bodin, and Borman the Louisiana rule
seems to have been consonant with the minority common law position. See, e.g.,
Shill v. New Orleans Public Service, 175 So. 113 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937);
Dipino v. Joe Gulino & Son, 154 So. 772 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934) ; Bridwell v.
Butler, 18 La. App. 675, 139 So. 51 (2d Cir. 1932).
30. E.g., Jackson v. Jones, 224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953) ; Westerfield v.
Levis, 43 La. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891) ; Cook v. Louisiana Public Utilities Co.,
19 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944) ; Kahn v. Shreveport Rys., 161 So. 636
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1935) ; Shalley v. New Orleans Public Service, 1 La. App.
770 (Orl. Cir. 1925).
31. The courts have several times announced the general rule that a minor
is liable for his offenses and quasi-offenses, Smith v. Freeman, 31 So. 2d 524
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1947) ; Seither v. Poter, 194 So. 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1940) ; Kern v. Knight, 13 La. App. 194, 127 So. 133 (1st Cir. 1930) ; Lutcher
& Moore Cypress Co. v. Schexnaydre, 11 La. App. 72, 122 So. 911 (Orl. Cir.
1929), and two early cases held minors were liable for fraud just as adults,
Christian v. Welch, 7 La. Ann. 533 (1852) ; Guidry v. Davis, 6 La. Ann. 90
(1851). However, apparently in none of these cases were the minors young
enough to raise the question of their capacity for fault. Two cases involving bat-
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tainty is possible as to intentional torts. In the only case in

which the issue was clearly before the court, a child under four
years was held incapable of fault in biting his nurse . 2 The
court, however, evinced no intention of extending the seven-year
age limit for negligence to intentional torts,

3

nor did it pro-

pound any general rule for determining
the effect of age on
34
liability for intentional torts.
The instant case held that the petition did not state a cause
of action because a child of six years is legally incapable of the
fault allegedA5 Though the court's rationale and exposition of
authority was far from explicit, this conclusion was apparently
reached by applying to an intentional tort the jurisprudential
3 6
rule that a child of seven or under is incapable of negligence.

Such a step seems questionable on the basis of common sense
and public policy. While there may be some basis for the position that a six-year-old is incapable of sufficient judgment to

foresee the unintended consequences of his acts, it is not at all
37
apparent that he is incapable of intending to do harmful acts.
teries by young children indicate some concessions will be granted children in
determining whether their intentional conduct was tortious. Cornelius v. Montegut, 8 Orl. App. 358 (1911) ; Magavero v. Centano, 6 Orl. App. 394, 397-98 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1909). In Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92, 93 (1885), the court

in dictum said fault might not be imputable to a child of six, but was unclear
whether the child's act was negligent or intentional. See also Yancey v. Maestri,
155 So. 509 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934) (insane person not liable for offenses and
quasi-offenses), where the court implies in dictum a child "of such tender age
as to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong" would not be liable. Id.
at 517.
32. Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934).
33. The court only stated "the doctrine of contributory negligence does not
apply to a child under four years of age." Id. at 590, 157 So. at 122. Thereafter,
no reference was made to any form of the negligence rule.
34. Several times the court used such phrases as "a minor child too young to
be deemed guilty of an offense of a quasi offense," id. at 592, 600, 613, 157 So.
at 123, 125, 129, and "misdeeds of their children of tender years and 'lack of
discernment.' " Id. at 608, 157 So. at 128. From this it might be inferred the
court accepted the French "age of reason" rule, but there is no clear holding to
this effect.
35. 154 So. 2d at 624.
36. The court stated: "[D]efendant's exceptions were based, primarily, upon
the proposition that a child six years old cannot be deemed guilty of an offense
or quasi-offense." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 624. And later: "[D]efendants
predicate their defense on the premise that: (1) A 6-year-old child is legally
incapable of negligence." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) After citing cases supporting
the negligence rule the court, without further discussion, affirmed the dismissal.
While it is possible the court treated the petition as alleging negligence on the
child's part, this seems unlikely in light of plaintiff's allegation that the damage
was "deliberately, wantonly and maliciously" inflicted. Ibid.
37. This distinction between negligent and intentional conduct of children has
been specifically made in common law jurisdictions. E.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116
Cal. App. 2d 310, 316-17, 253 P.2d 675, 678-79 (1953) ; Seaburg v. Williams, 16
Ill. App. 2d 295, 299, 148 N.E.2d 49, 51 (1958). In both Ellis and Seaburg
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Nor does it seem reasonable that a six-year-old lacks sufficient
discernment to be aware of his transgression while deliberately
damaging another's property.3 8 Furthermore, the result of the
court's approach seems inequitable: if the parent's personal
fault cannot be established, an innocent third party is left without recompense for damages intentionally inflicted by conduct
apparently substandard and inexcusable even in a six-year-old
child. Such a result seems inconsistent with the policy apparently expressed in article 2318 and found desirable in many
common law jurisdictions that the burden of depredatory acts
of children should be incurred as a family risk by the child's
parent. The desirability of furthering this policy by allowing
recovery in situations like that in the instant case would seem
to outweigh any administrative conveniences derived from extending to intentional torts the seven-year age limit for legal
capacity for negligence.
The conclusion reached in the instant case amply illustrates
the need for care not only in distinguishing the nature of the
tortious conduct in question, but also in weighing countervailing
policy considerations and recognizing available alternate paths.
It seems that a more equitable and reasonable result could have
been reached in the instant case by adopting either of the more
flexible rules employed in France and at common law for deterchildren under seven were found to have had sufficient maturity to be liable for
intentional torts. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
38. In France it would be theoretically possible to find a child under seven
has reached the age of reason and is liable for his delicts or intentional torts,
since the determination is essentially factual. 1 MAZEAUD nos 451, 458-459. However, the French courts have apparently been reluctant to impose liability on
children under nine or ten. Blanc-Jouvan, La responsabilitM de l'infans, 55 REVUE
TRfMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CiviL 28, 37, 46 (1957). This should not prevent the
Louisiana courts from applying the age of reason rule so as to achieve just results
in situations like that in the instant case, in which the liability of the parent is
in question. In France, since parental liability is predicated solely on the parent's fault, a child's capacity for fault only becomes an issue in a suit against a
child. The French courts' application of the age of reason rule, then, apparently
reflects a policy of protection of the child's interests. This policy would have no
'bearing on a suit against a parent in Louisiana and, furthermore, its application
in such suits would seem to be in derogation of the policy represented in article
2318 that damages caused by children are a family responsibility. Also, application of the age of reason rule favorable to the plaintiff (or the adoption of the
common law rule) would not materially endanger the child's interests since suit
is seldom brought against a child due to the ease of recovery against the parent
under the no fault liability provision of article 2318.
It is interesting to note the recent criticisms of the traditional French notion
that fault is essentially a subjective determination, and arguments advanced in
favor of a purely objective approach importing a tendency to disregard such subjective factors as lack of discernment or mental incapacity in fixing a defendant's liability and to place emphasis on providing relief to the injured party. See
generally 1 MAZEAUD no, 456-468. This trend suggests that the present application of the age of reason rule in France may be short lived.
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mining the liability of an infant for intentional harms.8 9 With
no Louisiana jurisprudence in direct conflict with either, 40 the
court was free to choose. It is submitted that either the French
"age of reason" rule or the common law rule that a child is
liable for his intentional torts when he is mature enough to
formulate the required intent should be introduced into Louisiana law.
George A. Kimball, Jr.
39. A similar result could have been achieved by accepting the "presumed
fault" interpretation of article 2318, under which the child's lack of maturity
would have no direct bearing on the parent's liability (see note 15 supra), but
this approach would run afoul of article 237, the Butterworth case, and other
holdings that there is no parental liability without fault of the child. See notes
16-18 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.

